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A non-parametric efficient statistical method, Random Forests, is implemented for the
selection of the determinants of Central Bank Independence (CBI) among a large database
of economic, political, and institutional variables for OECD countries. It permits ranking
all the determinants based on their importance in respect to the CBI and does not impose a
priori assumptions on potential nonlinear relationships in the data. Collinearity issues are
resolved, because correlated variables can be simultaneously considered.
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Introduction
Large panels of economic and financial data are becoming the starting point for
empirical analysis. Data manipulation tools and techniques, developed for small
datasets, will become increasingly inadequate. One of these techniques is (linear)
regression analysis, and although it is widely applied in economic works, it shows
some drawbacks. The selection of the relevant group of variables from a large
dataset might bring limitations due to the omitted variables issue and overfitting. It
is mainly linear and, when necessary, nonlinear terms and interactions should be
modelled a priori in the parametric model imposing the functional form.
Collinearity problems are addressed by excluding linearly correlated variables.
Missing data values are common obstacles that traditional methods cannot handle.
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An example of empirical research subject to the limitations above is the
determinants of Central Bank Independence (CBI). A higher degree of CBI is
associated with lower inflation rates, so that society reduces opposition to inflation
and public pressure for an independent central bank (Cukierman, 2008, 2013;
Alesina & Stella, 2011), and the political economy of monetary policymaking
(DeHaan & Eijffinger, 2016). The balance between flexibility and credibility in
monetary policymaking determines the equilibrium degree of CBI in a country. The
trade-off between costs and benefits in delegating the power to manage paper
money to reduce inflationary bias may depend on many aspects of the economy and
on its institutional framework (Alesina & Grilli, 1995). This has encouraged the
study of the determinants that influence the CBI among a large variety of economic
and institutional variables which cause changes in the degree of commitment of the
monetary policy (Fernández-Albertos, 2015; D’Amato, Pistoresi, & Salsano, 2009;
Farvaque, 2002). The usual way to obtain predictions on CBI is based on the linear
regression framework, given that the economic theory does not provide any
structural modelling. Furthermore, facing an increasing complexity of the available
data, this method faces a lot of problems such as omitted variables and overfitting,
as recently pointed out by Brumm (2011).
Machine learning has ways to deal with large databases (Varian, 2014).
Examples include boosting, support vector machines, AdaBoost, genetic
algorithms (Creamer & Freund, 2010; Emsia & Coskuner, 2016; Gogas,
Papadimitriou, Matthaiou, & Chrysanthidou, 2015; Zhou & Lai, 2017; Zhang &
Maringer, 2016), and Random Forests (RFs). An RF is an ensemble learner formed
by averaging binary tree predictors (Ho, 1995; Breiman, 2001). They are grown
non-deterministically, without pruning, using a two-step randomization procedure
and thus resulting in reduced bias. Breiman's RF algorithm was developed for
classification and regression settings with a variety of applications (Breiman, 2001;
Cutler et al., 2007). A Random Survival Forest (RSF) is an extension of Breiman's
RF methodology that can be used for building a prediction model in survival
analysis (Ishwaran, Kogalur, Blackstone, & Lauer, 2008). In survival settings, the
predictor is an ensemble formed by combining the results of many survival trees.
The base learner is a survival tree and the ensemble is a cumulative hazard function
formed by averaging each tree's Nelson-Aalen's cumulative hazard function.
Ishwaran, Kogalur, Gorodeski, Minn, and Lauer (2010) developed a highdimensional variable selection method based on minimal depth, which avoids
directly working with prediction error and relies on a theoretical basis.
RF provides a theoretically-justified variable importance measure and a
threshold to select and rank predictors. It provides the flexibility to uncover

3

CBI DETERMINANTS

complex data structures, such as dealing with nonlinear effects and interactions
among multiple types of variables while allowing for effective predictions due to
the law of large numbers and its two-step randomization approach. Moreover,
collinearity issues can be handled, since correlated variables can be considered in
the analysis. Finally, missing values can be dealt automatically, and the
methodology is applicable to high dimensional settings.
The problem of variable selection and prediction of CBI is approached via the
RF method, borrowing features from RSF, such as the minimal depth, in order to
overcome the drawbacks of linear regression. Particularly, the determinants of CBI
are selected among 58 economic and institutional variables (see the Appendix for
a detailed description of the variables), for 24 OECD economies, allowing any kind
of complexity (e.g., nonlinear relationships).

Methodology
In the case of a regression setting (e.g. problems where the response variable is a
quantitative variable), RSF and RF overlap.
RF Methodology
RF trees are formed as described:
Step 1. Draw B bootstrap samples from the original sample. Bootstrap
samples exclude on average 37% of the data, known as Out-of-Bag
(OOB) data.
Step 2. Grow a tree based on the data of each of the bootstrap samples
b = 1,…, B.
(a) At each tree node, randomly select a subset of predictor
variables on which to split.
(b) Among all binary splits defined by the predictors selected in (a),
find the best split into two subsets (the daughter nodes)
according to a suitable splitting criterion.
(c) Repeat (a), (b) recursively on each daughter node until a
stopping criterion is met.
Step 3. Aggregate information from the terminal nodes (nodes with no
further split) from the B trees to obtain a prediction ensemble
(predict new data by aggregating the predictions of all trees, i.e.
majority votes for classification, average for regression).
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Node splits are a very important step in the algorithm, determined by the
setting or type of response. For example, in the case of regression or multivariate
analysis, the default rule is the weighted Mean-Squared Error (MSE) (Breiman,
Friedman, Stone, & Olshen, 1984, chapter 8.4) or a composite normalized MSE,
respectively. For classification analysis, the rule is the Gini index (Breiman et al.,
1984, chapter 4.3). For mixed outcomes analysis, a multivariate normalized
composite split rule of MSE and Gini index splitting is invoked. For survival
analysis, a log-rank splitting rule is implemented (Segal, 1988; Leblanc & Crowley,
1993). For competing risk analysis, a modified weighted log-rank splitting rule,
modeled after Gray's test (Gray, 1988), is implemented. In our case, the MSE was
used as a splitting criterion.
An estimate of the prediction error can be obtained based on the OOB data as
follows:
a. At each bootstrap iteration, predict the OOB data using the tree grown
with the bootstrap sample.
b. Aggregate the OOB predictions. Calculate the error rate and call it the
OOB estimate of error rate (measured via mean-squared-error for
regression, misclassification error for classification, 1-Harrell's
concordance index for survival).
Variable Selection
In addition to the good prediction performance of the RF methods (RF and RSF),
they are useful tools for variable selection. They provide measures of variable
importance (VIMP), calculated for each predictor, so that variables are selected by
filtering on the basis of their VIMP. The VIMP of a variable is measured by the
change in the prediction error for the forest ensemble, when OOB data for that
variable is permuted, while all others are left unchanged. Although there are several
RF-based methods utilizing VIMP for variable selection, most of these procedures
are limited. Drawbacks of VIMP-like methods are the following: first, they are
dependent on the type of prediction error used; and second, a theoretical
justification is not available.
In contrast, an alternative way to calculate VIMP, along with a theoretical
justification for this new variable selection framework, was introduced by Ishwaran
and Kogalur (2007) and Ishwaran et al. (2008). For VIMP calculation, the variable
is not permuted. An OOB case is assigned a daughter node randomly whenever a
split on this variable is encountered in the in-bag tree. The VIMP of a variable is
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then the prediction error for the original forest subtracted from the prediction error
for the noised-up forest predictor. In both cases, positive VIMP values (and
especially largest values) indicate predictive variables. A rigorous approach for
variable selection via the concept of the maximal subtree and the statistic minimal
depth is presented. Let T be a binary recursively grown tree; that is, if T has M
terminal nodes, then T is the function that maps multivariable covariates into those
terminal nodes.
Definition 1. For each variable v, call Tv a v-subtree of T if the root node of Tv is
split using v. Call Tv a maximal v-subtree if Tv is not a subtree of a larger v-subtree.
Definition 2. A second order maximal (w, v)-subtree is a maximal w-subtree
within a maximal v-subtree for a variable v.
Definition 3. Let Dv be the distance from the root node to the root of the closest
maximal v-subtree for a given v. Then Dv takes values {0,…, D(T)}, where D(T) is
the depth of T (distance from the root farthest terminal node). Dv is called the
minimal depth of variable v.
This means that a maximal subtree of a variable v is defined to be the largest
subtree whose root node is split using v and no other parent node of the subtree is
split using v. Maximal subtrees can be used to quantify the predictiveness of a
variable as well as identify variable interactions.
Theorem 1. Let Dv be the minimal depth of v and πv,j(t) be the probability that v
is selected as candidate variable for splitting a node t of depth j, assuming no
maximal v-subtree exists at depth less than j. Let θv,j(t) be the probability that v
splits a node t of depth j given that v is a candidate variable for splitting t and no
maximal v-subtree exists at depth less than j. Then for depth d ∈ {0,…, D(T) − 1},
it holds
 d −1
lj 
ld
P Dv = d | l0 , , lD(T )−1 =  (1 −  v , j v , j )  1 − (1 −  v ,d v ,d )  ,

 j =0






(1)

where ld is the number of nodes at depth d.
The minimal depth of a maximal subtree or first order depth (for simplicity,
depth) equals the shortest distance from the root node to the parent node of the
maximal subtree. The second order depth is the distance from the root node to the
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second closest maximal subtree of that variable. The depth measures the
predictiveness of a variable. The smaller the minimal depth, the more impact a
variable has on prediction. Additionally, the mean of the minimal depth distribution
is used as the threshold value for deciding whether a variable's minimal depth value
is small enough for the variable to be classified as strong.
Mean Minimal Depth Threshold Rule
Choose a variable v if its forest-averaged minimal depth, Dv = dv, is less than
or equal to the mean minimal depth of Dv when v is a noisy variable. The advantage
of working with the methodology of maximal subtrees and their statistics is that
they are dimensionless, they are free to any type of prediction error, and they apply
to all forests settings (survival, classification, and regression). It was extended to
high-dimensional data. The minimal depth distribution in equation (1) was studied
under various scenarios and its fairly robust threshold value for identifying strong
variables imposes an automated variable selection method.
Random Survival Forests-Like Strategy
Although a regression setting is examined, this approach could easily be adopted in
alternative settings. The following steps are implemented with the R software
package randomSurvivalForest:
a. Grow a random forest to yield regression using a weighted mean squared
error splitting rule
b. Implement a random forest variable selection using a tree minimal depth
methodology to rank all variables in terms of importance in the model
c. Find the threshold value as the mean of the minimal depth distribution for
selecting the most predictive variables in the RF model; that is variables
with minimal depth smaller than the calculated threshold
Data and Economic Framework
Theoretical models on CBI suggest a large set of characteristics of a nation's
economy that cause changes in the degree of independence of the monetary policy,
e.g. inflation rate, size of the economy, GDP per capita, and various measures of
efficiency of institutions. Moreover, the inflationary bias has specific features in
open economies due to the interdependence in the stabilization monetary policy. In
this context, international business cycle synchronization, the degree of openness,
and exchange regime are also important (D’Amato et al., 2009). The political
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economy approaches suggested this institutional innovation should be understood,
not only in terms of economic efficiency, but also in terms of political convenience,
adding other potential determinants of CBI. Politically heterogenous contexts, such
as systems of checks and balance, federal systems, or coalition or multiparty
governments have incentive to delegate to an independent monetary authority (see
Fernández-Albertos, 2015). This wide literature has encouraged the study of the
determinants that influence CBI among the variety of economic, social, and
institutional variables that cause changes in the degree of commitment of the
monetary policy.
Consider the predictors of CBI for 24 OECD economies. In the considered
period, the countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK,
and the US, over the period 1980-2003. CBI is measured by the legal independence
index of Cukierman (1992) and updated by Polillo and Guillén (2005) until 2003.
The 58 predictors are economic, political and institutional determinants of the CBI.
The economic variables are taken from the International Monetary Fund
(2009) and the World Bank Group (2008) databases and include: two proxies for
the world-wide component in the business cycle (i.e. the correlation between the
GDP growth in each country and the world or US GDP growth); a dummy EMU
variable, taking the value one in the 1998-2003 period for the countries that joined
the European Monetary Union after complying with the convergence criteria
provided for by the Maastricht Treaty; different measures of inflation (i.e.
current/past inflation and past average inflation); and various measures of
development (i.e., log real GDP total and real GDP growth rate). For the world
GDP growth, a weighted average of the growth rates of the economies in the sample
was used, with weights equal to the GDP levels in each country. The average GDP
correlation 1960-79 was used to analyze the CBI 1980-91 to reduce the endogeneity
problem, and the average GDP correlation 1980-92 to study the CBI 1992-2003.
Moreover, past average inflation of 1960-79 and 1980-92 was used to analyze the
CBI 1980-91 and CBI 1992-2003, respectively.
The political and institutional variables are from the DPI2006 database of
World Bank by Keefer (2007). This database is divided into five different groups:
1) Chief Executive variables containing variables that are relevant to characterize
the executive power (e.g., whether countries are presidential or parliamentary;
number of years in office of the chief executive); 2) Party variables in the legislature
including those variables relevant to the parties that make up the legislative power
(e.g., government fractionalization, the number of government/opposition seats;
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average age of parties); 3) Electoral rules that are relevant to the electoral rules (e.g.,
mean district magnitude; if plurality system; proportional representation);
4) Stability and checks and balances, containing relevant variables to the stability
of the political system (e.g., longest/shorter tenure of a veto players) 5) Federalism,
including variables relevant to the state form (e.g., if there are autonomous regions
or municipal governments locally elected and whether it is a federal state).
The political and institutional variables used in the empirical analysis are
listed below. A detailed definition of each variable can be found in the DPI2006 by
Keefer (2007). The same definitions hold here when commenting on the results.
1) Chief Executive variables: system, yrsoff, finittrm, yrcurnt, multpl, allhouse;
2) Party variables in the legislature: herfgov, govfrac, numgov, numvote, gov1seat,
gov1vote, gov2seats, gov2vote, gov3seats, gov3vote, govothst, herfopp, oppfrac,
numopp, oppvote, opp1seat, opp1vote, opp2seat, opp2vote opp3seat, opp3vote,
oppothst, herftot, frac, oppmajh, maj, partyage, exelec, execspec, govspec,
coalspec; 3) Electoral rules: liec, mdmh, plurality, pr, housesys; 4) Stability and
checks and balance: tenlong, tenshort, tenshortlax, checks, stabs, stabns;
5) Federalism: auton, federal.
To select the determinants of CBI, the RF is applied. There are few
suggestions from the economic theory to properly model the underlying
relationships. Here, minimal depth is used to assess a variable's predictiveness. A
built-in threshold, which is independent of a priori tuning of parameters, is
provided for variable selection. Computations were implemented using the freely
available R software package randomForestSRC (RStudio, 2015; Ishwaran &
Kogalur, 2007).

Results
Reported in Table 1 are the ranked minimal depth (depth) of the selected variables
based on the RF analysis of the CBI dataset. The model size turns out to be 10, for
depth threshold equal to 6.08. Another selected variable is time, which indicates the
temporal variation of some macro-economic variables and it is not commented on
further. Variable importance (vimp) is also provided (as introduced above),
confirming depth ordering. The cumulative contribution of the selected variables is
computed from the normalized variable importance (vimpnorm) (see Grömping,
2009). The variable emu, which mainly reflects a change in the institutional design
of monetary policy, is a major determinant (41% of the total variation in CBI), past
average inflation, business cycles synchronization, and the degree of development
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explain 16%, 19%, and 4% of the CBI variation, respectively, while political
variables account for the remaining 20% of the CBI variation.
The marginal effect of each selected variable on CBI is examined in Figures
1 and 2. The vertical axis displays the predicted CBI, while each predictor is plotted
on the horizontal axis. The dummy emu suggests that participation in the Euro (emu
equal to 1 in Figure 1) implies a greater CBI: it encourages the individual countries
to change the institutional design of the monetary policy in view of greater price
stability.
Table 1. Minimal depth and variable importance (denoted by vimp, vimpnorm when
normalized) obtained from RSF analysis of CBI dataset; the latter includes 59 variables
for 24 OECD countries and spans from 1980 to 2003, as described in a previous section;
the selection of 10 variables comes from a depth threshold equal to 6.08
Series
emu
averageinfl
world cycle
usa cycle
mdmh
numgov
logrealgdp
gov1seat
numopp
opp1seat

depth
1.4440
3.0120
3.3400
3.6230
4.2590
4.7050
5.3920
5.4820
5.5540
6.0010

vimp
0.0280
0.0110
0.0070
0.0060
0.0050
0.0040
0.0020
0.0030
0.0020
0.0020

vimpnorm
0.4080
0.1580
0.1000
0.0920
0.0690
0.0510
0.0350
0.0360
0.0260
0.0230

Figure 1. Marginal effect plot of the dummy variable emu on the CBI index
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Figure 2. Marginal effect plots of the predictor variables avergeinfl, WORLD CYCLE,
USA CYCLE, logrealgdp, mdmh, numgov, numopp, gov1seat, opp1seat on the predicted
CBI index shown by the curves; each country’s mean predictor value is displayed with
vertical line marks at the horizontal axis

The predicted smoothed curves in Figure 2 suggest the prevalent positive or
negative behavior of the selected variables towards CBI given the mean predictor
values of each country (ticks at the bottom). Nonlinearity of the variable past
average inflation (denoted by averageinfl) is recognized; in fact, the relation with
CBI stays negative when the level of inflation is up to 6-7%, and changes sign
afterwards. However, there exists a dominant negative relation suggested by the
accumulation of points (countries) to the left side of the averageinfl graph in Figure
2. This fact supports the idea stressed by Cukierman (1992) that inflation leads to
the evolution of automatic accommodative mechanisms such as indexation of
contracts in the labor and capital markets to the general price level. Society reduces
opposition to inflation and public pressure for an independent central bank.
Then, an almost linear and positive behavior can be detected for the two
variables regarding synchronization of business cycles (WORLD CYCLE and USA
CYCLE). The larger the size of the common component in the business cycle in
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the countries, the larger the CBI. To understand this result, consider that
governments expect their economies to be in the same state of the world (boom or
slumps) as foreign economies. Governments in each country have a strategic
incentive to commit monetary policy in order to free ride on the stabilization
provided abroad and gain credibility at home. Hence, the larger the correlation
among shocks, the larger the incentives to commitment, i.e. the larger the CBI (see
D’Amato & Martina, 2005).
From the point of view of the inflationary bias approach to monetary policy,
the impact of per capita GDP is not clear-cut. The real GDP per capita (logrealgdp)
is found to be linearly and positively linked to CBI. On the one hand, a higher level
of per capita income level entails a lower degree of (real and financial) market
failures in the economy, a more efficient fiscal system, and therefore a lower
incentive to create inflation for the central banker. On the other hand, economic
agents in high-income countries might be better hedged against inflation; hence,
their inflation aversion may be lower (Campillo & Miron, 1997). Opposite effects
on the inflationary bias in monetary policy entail opposite effects on the incentives
to precommit monetary policy. The real GDP per capita is considered to be an
indicator of a general measure of development. In Romer (1993), a larger per capita
GDP has a negative impact on inflation, i.e. lower inflationary bias. The reduced
inflationary bias lowers the incentive to commit with negative impact on the level
of independence of the central bank. Lane (1997) and Campillo and Miron (1997)
obtained a positive sign for the log per capita GDP on average inflation. Hence, the
present outcome is not consistent with the commitment interpretation of the results
in Romer, but it is in line with Campillo and Miron’s argument.
Also, the relationship between political instability and the level of dependence
is not clear-cut in the commitment literature. The high variability of the political
environment may imply a lower ability to achieve commitment of monetary policy
through delegation to an independent institution. However, a larger political
instability may increase the benefits of commitment. From an empirical point of
view, the relation between political instability and CBI is ambiguous and mainly
depends on the variable used to proxy instability. For example, Cukierman (1992)
predicted and empirically verified a high level of party-political instability induces
a larger level of independence, whereas the political instability regime has a
negative effect on CBI. A partial list of similar studies, in which different measures
of political instability and several indices of CBI are used, includes de Haan and
van't Hag (1995), Habibi and Bagheri (1997), and Farvaque (2002). Broadly
speaking, the literature on the political economy approach to CBI suggests a
politically heterogeneous context (federal systems, strong systems of checks and

12

CAVICCHIOLI ET AL

balance, coalition and multiparty governments) pushes for the adoption of
independent central banks (see Fernández-Albertos, 2015).
Among the political variables, the following are found to be relevant: the
mean district magnitude (mdmh), the number of government and opposition seats
(numgov and numopp), and the number of seats of the largest government party
and of the largest opposition party (gov1seats and opp1seats). An increase in district
magnitude induces a higher CBI, given the accumulation of country-points in the
first bit of the curve. The rationale behind this outcome is that an increase in district
magnitude tends to increase the number of parties and party system fragmentation
(Rae, 1995); so, the larger the heterogeneity in policy preferences, the larger the
CBI.
Similar results are obtained for the government and the opposition parties.
The larger the number of government seats, makes the policy making more difficult
and induces a greater incentive to delegate to an independent central. A similar
argument holds for the number of opposition seats. Moreover, the larger the first
government party, the smaller the CBI, while the larger the first opposition party,
the greater the CBI. This is even clearer when taking into account the relative
weight, in terms of number of seats, for these two parties, focusing on the nonlinear
behavior in Figure 2. In fact, up to about 100 seats, the effect on CBI is positive
(resp. negative) for gov1seat (resp. opp1seat) while it is negative (resp. positive)
for a number larger than 100. In general, the larger the fragmentation of the
government or party system, the larger the CBI index.

Conclusion
The random forests (RFs) method was implemented to identify the main
determinants of the Central Bank Independence (CBI) index from a large database
of institutional, political, and economic variables. To the best of our knowledge,
RF has not been previously used for the identification of CBI determinants,
although it has been utilized in finance (e.g., Creamer & Freund, 2010; De Luca,
Rivieccio, & Zuccolotto, 2010; Booth, Gerding, & McGroarty, 2015; Ward, 2017).
RF has been utilized to overcome limitations such as omitted variables, collinearity,
overfitting, and linear functional form of the regression.
Considering multicollinearity in regression analysis directly bears on whether
the coefficients of the model are uniquely identified. This can be problematic from
an inferential view: if two variables are correlated, increases in the first variable
may be offset by decreases in the second one (and vise versa), so the combined
effect is to negate each other. On the other hand, a regularization is performed in
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RF through the number of variables sampled at each split. The larger the number
of features to choose from, the better splits one can obtain. That also makes each
tree more highly correlated with the others, somewhat moderating the diversifying
effect of estimating multiple trees in the first place. Importantly, no part of the RF
is harmed by highly collinear variables. If two variables provide the same child
node purity, one of them may be picked without diminishing the quality of the result.
The original paper of Breiman (2001) discusses those issues in detail; however,
further studies focus on those advantages of RF, such as Kimes (2006), Dormann
et al. (2013), and Kane, Price, Scotch, and Rabinowitz (2014).
Variable selection is efficiently performed, and new implications are derived
with respect to the empirical literature on CBI. The analysis shows that the
economic variables account for 80% of the variation in CBI, while the ones
reflecting party system's fragmentation explain the remaining 20%. Two-thirds of
the explained variation due to the economic group is attributed to external
constraints, that is, international business cycle and the participation in the
European Monetary Union (EMU). Moreover, half of the selected predictors
interact nonlinearly with the CBI index, for example average inflation and the
number of party seats. Such an empirical strategy turns out to be particularly
important when a clear structural model is not available to the researcher, as in this
specific economic problem.
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Appendix: Political and institutional variables from the
DPI2006 database of World Bank by Keefer (2006)
1) Chief Executive Variables:
system: it indicates the type of the political system. Its values are: 0 if the system
is presidential, 1 if the president is assembly elected, 2 if it is parliamentary
yrsoffc: it indicates how many years the chief executive has been in office
finittrm: it’s a dummy that indicates if there is finite term in the office (1) or if
there is not (0)
yrcurnt: it indicates the years left in the current term
multpl: it indicates when there are formal restraints on an executive’s term (NA
if not), if he can serve additional terms following the current one (1) or not (0)
allhouse: it indicates if the party of the executive controls (1) or not (0) one of the
relevant houses
2) Party variables in the legislature:
herfgov: it is the Herfindahl index of the government, i.e., the sum of the squared
seat shares of all parties in the government
govfrac: it is the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the
government parties will be of different parties
numgov: it indicates the number of total parliament seats held by government
parties
numvote: it indicates the vote share of government parties
gov1seat: it indicates the seats of the first government party
gov1vote: it indicates the vote share of the first government party
gov2seat: it indicates the seats of the second government party
gov2vote: it indicates the vote share of the second government party
gov3seat: it indicates the seats of the third government party
gov3vote: it indicates the vote share of the third government party
govothst: it indicates the seats of the other government parties
herfopp: it is the Herfindahl index of the opposition, calculated in the same
manner as the Herfindahl government
oppfrac: it is the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the
opposition parties will be of different parties
numopp: it indicates the number of opposition seats
oppvote: it is the vote share of opposition parties
opp1seat: it indicates the seats of the first opposition party
opp1vote: it indicates the vote share of the first opposition party
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opp2seat: it indicates the seats of the second opposition party
opp2vote: it indicates the vote share of the second opposition party
opp3seat: it indicates the seats of the third opposition party
opp3vote: it indicates the vote share of the third opposition party
oppothst: it indicates the seats of the other opposition parties
herftot: it is the Herfindahl total index, calculated in the same manner as the
Herfindahl of the government and Herfindahl of the opposition
frac: it is the probability that two deputies picked at random from the legislature
will be of different parties
oppmajh: it is a dummy, which is 1 if the opposition party has an absolute
majority in House
maj: it is the margin of majority, i.e., the fraction of seats held by the government,
calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total (government plus
opposition plus non-aligned) seats
partyage: it is the average of the ages of the first government party, second
government party and first opposition party or the subset of these for which age
of party is known
exelec: this variable indicates if there is (1) or not (0) an executive election in the
current year
execspec: it is a dummy which is 1 if there is executive party special interest
govspec: it is a dummy which is 1 if there is first government party special interest
coalspec: it is a dummy which is 1 if there are any coalition parties’ special
interest
3) Electoral rules:
liec: it is an index of electoral competitiveness: it goes from 1 to 7, and an
increasing value corresponds to a decreasing vote share of the largest party
mdmh: it represents the weighted average of the number of representatives
elected by each constituency size
pluralty: it has a value equal to 1 if the legislative election winner takes the
majority of the seats, and it’s 0 otherwise
pr: it has a value equal to 1 if there is proportional representation in legislative
elections, 0 otherwise
housesys: it deals with electoral rules: is equal to 1 if the majority of seats are
assigned with plurality rules, and it’s 0 if they are assigned with proportional rules
4) Stability and checks and balance:
tenlong: it measures the tenure of veto player with the longest tenure
tenshort and tenshortlax: they measure the tenure (years) of the veto player with
the shortest tenure; their difference depends on the numbers of veto players.
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checks: it indicates the number of veto players
stabs: it counts the percent of veto players who drop from the government in any
given year
5) Federalism:
auton: it is a dummy which is 1 if there are autonomous regions
federal: it takes value 0 if neither local executive nor local legislature are locally
elected, 1 if the executive is appointed, but the legislature elected, 2 if they are
both locally elected.
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